RT Article
T1 On the alleged connection between moral evil and human freedom: A response to Trakakis’ second critique
JF Sophia
VO 45
IS 2
SP 131
OP 138
A1 Tierno, Joel Thomas
LA English
YR 2006
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1785589423
AB In this essay, I answer Nick Trakakis’ second critique of my argument against the adequacy of traditional free will theodicy. I argue, first, that Trakakis errs in his implicit assertion that my argument relies upon our being strongly malevolent by nature. I argue, second, that Trakakis errs in thinking that our being weakly benevolent, morally bivalent, or weakly malevolent by nature is sufficient to refute my critique of the traditional freewill theodicy. I still maintain that the argument from freedom of the will offers an explanation of moral evil that is, in the final analysis, manifestly inadequate.
K1 Receive Nature
K1 Moral Evil
K1 Human Freedom
K1 Adequate Explanation
K1 Natural Disposition
DO 10.1007/BF02782488