Minds, programs, and Chinese philosophers: A Chinese perspective on the Chinese room
The paper is concerned with John Searle’s famous Chinese room argument. Despite being objected to by some, Searle’s Chinese room argument appears very appealing. This is because Searle’s argument is based on an intuition about the mind that ‘we’ all seem to share. Ironically, however, Chinese philos...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Springer Netherlands
2004
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| Στο/Στη: |
Sophia
Έτος: 2004, Τόμος: 43, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 61-72 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Western Philosophy
B Folk Psychology B Chinese Script B Chinese Room B Chinese Philosopher |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Σύνοψη: | The paper is concerned with John Searle’s famous Chinese room argument. Despite being objected to by some, Searle’s Chinese room argument appears very appealing. This is because Searle’s argument is based on an intuition about the mind that ‘we’ all seem to share. Ironically, however, Chinese philosophers don’t seem to share this same intuition. The paper begins by first analysing Searle’s Chinee room argument. It then introduces what can be seen as the (implicit) Chinese view of the mind. Lastly, it demonstrates a conceptual difference between Chinese and Western philosophy with respect to the notion of mind. Thus, it is shown that one must carefully attend to the presuppositions underlying Chinese philosophising in interpreting Chinese philosophers. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/BF02782437 |