Minds, programs, and Chinese philosophers: A Chinese perspective on the Chinese room
The paper is concerned with John Searle’s famous Chinese room argument. Despite being objected to by some, Searle’s Chinese room argument appears very appealing. This is because Searle’s argument is based on an intuition about the mind that ‘we’ all seem to share. Ironically, however, Chinese philos...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Springer Netherlands
2004
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| En: |
Sophia
Año: 2004, Volumen: 43, Número: 1, Páginas: 61-72 |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Western Philosophy
B Folk Psychology B Chinese Script B Chinese Room B Chinese Philosopher |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Sumario: | The paper is concerned with John Searle’s famous Chinese room argument. Despite being objected to by some, Searle’s Chinese room argument appears very appealing. This is because Searle’s argument is based on an intuition about the mind that ‘we’ all seem to share. Ironically, however, Chinese philosophers don’t seem to share this same intuition. The paper begins by first analysing Searle’s Chinee room argument. It then introduces what can be seen as the (implicit) Chinese view of the mind. Lastly, it demonstrates a conceptual difference between Chinese and Western philosophy with respect to the notion of mind. Thus, it is shown that one must carefully attend to the presuppositions underlying Chinese philosophising in interpreting Chinese philosophers. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/BF02782437 |