The contingency argument—A reply
Brian Medlin has excluded the possibility of something being self-explanatory in anything but a logical sense. Hence any non-logical necessity has always to be in terms of something other than the explicand. In this context, the principle of sufficient reason cannot escape contraction to a form so p...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Netherlands
1967
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| In: |
Sophia
Year: 1967, Volume: 6, Issue: 1, Pages: 8-20 |
| Further subjects: | B
Logical Necessity
B Present Actuality B Brute Fact B Sufficient Reason B Logical Truth |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
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| 520 | |a Brian Medlin has excluded the possibility of something being self-explanatory in anything but a logical sense. Hence any non-logical necessity has always to be in terms of something other than the explicand. In this context, the principle of sufficient reason cannot escape contraction to a form so patently useless that no proponent of the contingency argument would want to employ it. Many of the objections in Section 4 have point, however, only against an argument which uses such an unacceptable form of the principle., The objections in Section 5 are directed against an argument framed in the only other way allowable under Medlin’s dichotomy, but which is of no use to the theist, for the simple-reason that its conclusion is not existential in the required (present actuality) sense. Objections against such an argument would concern the theist only if their validity were so wide as to embrace a truly existential argument as well. As we have-seen it is in just that case that they break down., In neither Section 4 nor 5, therefore, does the article come to grips with the contingency argument. The objections leave it untouched, because neither of Medlin’s notions of contingency and necessity corresponds to that which is operative in the argument. | ||
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