EXISTENCE: WHO NEEDS IT? THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM AND MERELY POSSIBLE PEOPLE

In formulating procreative principles, it makes sense to begin by thinking about whose interests ought to matter to us. Obviously, we care about those who exist. Less obviously, but still uncontroversially, we care about those who will exist. Ought we to care about those who might possibly, but will...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Weinberg, Rivka (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Wiley-Blackwell 2013
In: Bioethics
Year: 2013, Volume: 27, Issue: 9, Pages: 471-484
Further subjects:B de dicto
B Procreation
B possible people
B Future People
B Non-Identity
B de re
B Existence
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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