Abortion, Value and the Sanctity of Life

In Life's Dominion Dworkin argues that the debate about abortion is habitually misconstrued. Substantial areas of agreement are overlooked, while areas of disagreement are, mistakenly, seen as central. If we uncover a truer picture, then hope of a certain accord may no longer seem vain. I dispu...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Belshaw, Christopher (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Wiley-Blackwell 1997
In: Bioethics
Year: 1997, Volume: 11, Issue: 2, Pages: 130-150
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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