RT Article
T1 Why the All-Affected Principle Is Groundless
JF Journal of moral philosophy
VO 18
IS 6
SP 571
OP 596
A1 Bengtson, Andreas
A1 Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper
A2 Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper
LA English
YR 2021
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1781873399
AB Abstract The all-affected principle is a widely accepted solution to the problem of constituting the demos. Despite its popularity, a basic question in relation to the principle has not received much attention: why does the fact that an individual is affected by a certain decision ground a right to inclusion in democratic decision-making about that matter? An answer to this question must include a reason that explains why an affected individual should be included because she is affected. We identify three such reasons in the literature – to wit, interest protection, self-government and welfare – and show why they all fail. We then propose two alternative reasons, equal relations and fairness, and show why they are also deficient. Surprisingly, the all-affected principle then appears groundless, which supports withholding belief in the all-affected principle or(/and) investing future research in identifying the thus-far unidentified reason why being affected grounds a claim to inclusion.
K1 the all-subjected principle
K1 democratic inclusion
K1 Democracy
K1 the problem of constituting the demos
K1 the all-affected principle
DO 10.1163/17455243-20213473