Anselm and the Apophatic: “Something Greater than Can Be Thought”
Anselm's ontological proof, which sets out to show that God must exist and which depends upon the premise that human beings can conceptualize God, seems antithetical to the apophatic tradition, but Anselm's work in general and his proof in particular are, nonetheless, exemplars of apophasi...
| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2008
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| In: |
New blackfriars
Jahr: 2008, Band: 89, Heft: 1020, Seiten: 177-193 |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Ontological Proof
B God/necessary existence B Anselm of Canterbury B Atheist/theist B Apophasis |
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Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Zusammenfassung: | Anselm's ontological proof, which sets out to show that God must exist and which depends upon the premise that human beings can conceptualize God, seems antithetical to the apophatic tradition, but Anselm's work in general and his proof in particular are, nonetheless, exemplars of apophasis. The proof shows the atheist's position to be untenable, while also revealing the ambiguities of the believer's claim. In proving the necessary existence of God, Anselm destroys all idols and with them, all human conceptions of divinity, for whatever conception can be achieved always stands vulnerable to being overcome. Thus, Anselm is left to conclude that God is in fact “something greater than can be thought.” Anselm shows that language can never offer a final and complete formulation for God, and he does so through his own name for God (“something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought”), a name that remains brilliantly open and which is ingenious, not for what it affirms about God, but rather for what it denies. |
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| ISSN: | 1741-2005 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: New blackfriars
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-2005.2007.00196.x |
