Schellenberg's Noseeum Assumption about Nonresistant Nonbelief
In this article, I outline a strategy for challenging J.L. Schellenberg's hiddenness argument, and specifically the premise within the argument that asserts the existence of what Schellenberg calls nonresistant nonbelief. Drawing on some of the philosophical resources of skeptical theism, I sh...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
2021
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| Στο/Στη: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Έτος: 2021, Τόμος: 13, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 139-156 |
| Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Schellenberg, J. L. 1959-, Divine hiddenness and human reason
/ Έλλειψη πίστης <μοτίβο>
/ Ερώτημα της ύπαρξης του Θεού
/ Επιχειρηματολογία
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| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | AB Φιλοσοφία της θρησκείας, Κριτική της θρησκείας, Αθεϊσμός NBC Δόγμα του Θεού |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
hiddenness argument
B Skeptical theism |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Σύνοψη: | In this article, I outline a strategy for challenging J.L. Schellenberg's hiddenness argument, and specifically the premise within the argument that asserts the existence of what Schellenberg calls nonresistant nonbelief. Drawing on some of the philosophical resources of skeptical theism, I show how this premise is based on a particular "noseeum assumption" - what I call Schellenberg's Noseeum Assumption - that underwrites a particular "noseeum argument." This assumption is that, regarding putative nonresistant nonbelievers, more likely than not we'd detect these nonbelievers' resistance toward God if there were any. I give reasons for thinking that it is not more reasonable to affirm than to refrain from affirming Schellenberg's Noseeum Assumption, and so reason to think that the hiddenness argument is not a good argument for atheism. I also defend the strategy I outline against several objections. |
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| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.2021.3085 |