E. J. Lowe and Divine Causal Agency
In this essay, I apply Lowe’s theory of rational agency to God's causal activity. I argue that Lowe's account fits well the traditional notions that God acts in the world for reasons. In contrast to Lowe’s analysis of human causal agency, I argue that in the divine case, reasons for acting...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Έκδοση: |
2021
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| Στο/Στη: |
TheoLogica
Έτος: 2021, Τόμος: 5, Τεύχος: 2, Σελίδες: 161-177 |
| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | KAJ Εκκλησιαστική Ιστορία 1914-, Σύγχρονη Εποχή NBC Δόγμα του Θεού VA Φιλοσοφία |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Agency
B Cause B Volition B Reasons B God |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Σύνοψη: | In this essay, I apply Lowe’s theory of rational agency to God's causal activity. I argue that Lowe's account fits well the traditional notions that God acts in the world for reasons. In contrast to Lowe’s analysis of human causal agency, I argue that in the divine case, reasons for acting are not constituted by needs. They are constituted by God's desires or plans. The fit between Lowe's account of causal agency and the contours of divine causal agency motivate an argument in favor of Lowe's theory. Any philosopher who is a theist ought to think Lowe's account is likely to be true. |
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| ISSN: | 2593-0265 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: TheoLogica
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.14428/thl.v5i2.58973 |
