Government initiated corporate social responsibility activities: evidence from a poverty alleviation campaign in China
In 2016 the Chinese government initiated a nationwide campaign aiming to eliminate poverty in China by 2020. Over 20% of listed firms in China have made significant contributions to the campaign. Using hand-collected data on listed firms’ contributions to the campaign and multivariate analyses, we e...
Authors: | ; ; |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer
2021
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In: |
Journal of business ethics
Year: 2021, Volume: 173, Issue: 4, Pages: 661-685 |
Further subjects: | B
Corporate social responsibility
B Incentives B G41 B Government B China B Aufsatz in Zeitschrift B Poverty Alleviation |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | In 2016 the Chinese government initiated a nationwide campaign aiming to eliminate poverty in China by 2020. Over 20% of listed firms in China have made significant contributions to the campaign. Using hand-collected data on listed firms’ contributions to the campaign and multivariate analyses, we examine whether managers’ and politicians’ personal incentives play an important role in firms’ contributions to the campaign. The results show that firms are more likely to contribute if they are state-owned and managers are appointed by governments, if managers have a higher risk of being targeted in a concurrent anti-corruption campaign, if the political leaders in their province are new or intend to seek promotion, and if managers or directors have experienced poverty in their early life. The results suggest that it is important to consider managers’ and politicians’ personal incentives in CSR activities that could have a grand social impact. |
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ISSN: | 1573-0697 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10551-020-04538-w |