How Did She Get So Good? On Virtue and Skill

In his recent book on skill and virtue, Matt Stichter provides an account based on work in empirical psychology, specifically on self-regulation. In this paper I wish to argue that while this account is novel and well informed, it falls short. I present several examples that I believe Stichter’s vie...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Bashour, Bana (Author)
Format: Electronic Review
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2021
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2021, Volume: 24, Issue: 2, Pages: 563-575
Further subjects:B Book review
B Skill
B Virtue
B Moral Psychology
B Aristotle
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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