Future truth and freedom
It is debated among open theists whether propositions about the contingent future should be regarded as straightforwardly true or false, as all false without exception, or as lacking truth-values. This article discusses some recent work on this topic and proposes a solution different than the one I...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Nature B. V
2021
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In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2021, Volume: 90, Issue: 2, Pages: 109-119 |
Further subjects: | B
Richard Purtill
B Open Theism B Hard and soft facts B Alexander Pruss B Benjamin Arbour B future contingent propositions |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | It is debated among open theists whether propositions about the contingent future should be regarded as straightforwardly true or false, as all false without exception, or as lacking truth-values. This article discusses some recent work on this topic and proposes a solution different than the one I have previously endorsed. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-021-09792-0 |