Aristotle on Substance as Primary in Time
Abstract In a notoriously obscure passage in Metaphysics 7.1 Aristotle claims that substance is primary in time. The only concrete literal interpretation suggested so far of this controversial claim is in terms of existing before and after in time. I argue that this interpretation faces serious prob...
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Brill
2021
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| Dans: |
Phronesis
Année: 2021, Volume: 66, Numéro: 3, Pages: 274-293 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
primacy / priority
B Substance B Time B Metaphysics B Aristotle |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | Abstract In a notoriously obscure passage in Metaphysics 7.1 Aristotle claims that substance is primary in time. The only concrete literal interpretation suggested so far of this controversial claim is in terms of existing before and after in time. I argue that this interpretation faces serious problems. I then present a novel literal interpretation, in terms of being an appropriate subject of temporal predications, that is immune to these problems and strongly supported by philosophical and contextual considerations. |
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| ISSN: | 1568-5284 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Phronesis
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/15685284-12341049 |