RT Article
T1 A Sellarsian Transcendental Argument against External World Skepticism
JF International journal for the study of skepticism
VO 11
IS 3
SP 193
OP 223
A1 Geier, Marin
LA English
YR 2021
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1767697376
AB Abstract This paper investigates the relation between what James Conant has called Kantian and Cartesian varieties of skepticism. It is argued that a solution to the most prominent example of a Kantian variety of skepticism, i.e. Kripkensteinian skepticism about rule-following and meaning, can be found in the works of Wilfrid Sellars. It is then argued that, on the basis of that very same solution to the Kantian problematic of rule-following and meaning, a novel argument against external world skepticism can be formulated. This argument takes the shape of a transcendental argument, which is reminiscent of Hilary Putnam’s infamous argument against the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, but is, as is argued, superior to it in certain respects.
K1 Wilfrid Sellars
K1 transcendental arguments
K1 Cartesian skepticism
K1 Kantian skepticism
K1 meaning skepticism
K1 Rule-following
DO 10.1163/22105700-20201365