A defense of modal appearances
I argue that beliefs about what appears possible are justified in much the same way as beliefs about what appears actual. I do so by chisholming, and then modalizing, the epistemic principle associated with phenomenal conservatism. The principle is tested against a number of examples, and it gives t...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado: |
2021
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| En: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Año: 2021, Volumen: 89, Número: 3, Páginas: 243-261 |
| (Cadenas de) Palabra clave estándar: | B
Modalidad
/ Epistemologische Überzeugung
/ Prueba ontológica de la existencia de Dios
/ Dualismo
/ Dualismo cartesiano
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| Clasificaciones IxTheo: | AB Filosofía de la religión VA Filosofía |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Conceivability
B Phenomenal Conservatism B Ontological Argument B Modal epistemology B Dualism |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Sumario: | I argue that beliefs about what appears possible are justified in much the same way as beliefs about what appears actual. I do so by chisholming, and then modalizing, the epistemic principle associated with phenomenal conservatism. The principle is tested against a number of examples, and it gives the intuitively correct results. I conclude by considering how it can be used to defend two controversial modal arguments, a Cartesian argument for dualism and an ontological argument for the existence of God. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-020-09779-3 |
