The Problem of Evil, Skeptical Theism and Moral Epistemology
This paper argues that skeptical theism isn’t susceptible to criticisms of the view presented in James Sterba’s new book on the logical problem of evil. Nevertheless, Sterba’s argument does serve to underscore the unpalatable moral-epistemological consequences of skeptical theistic skepticism (STS):...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
MDPI
2021
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| En: |
Religions
Año: 2021, Volumen: 12, Número: 5 |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Ethics
B Philosophy of religion B axiological skepticism B problem of evil B Skeptical theism B modal skepticism B moral skepticism B moral epistemology |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Sumario: | This paper argues that skeptical theism isn’t susceptible to criticisms of the view presented in James Sterba’s new book on the logical problem of evil. Nevertheless, Sterba’s argument does serve to underscore the unpalatable moral-epistemological consequences of skeptical theistic skepticism (STS): for precisely the reasons that STS doesn’t succumb to Sterba’s critique, STS threatens to undermine moral knowledge altogether. |
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| ISSN: | 2077-1444 |
| Reference: | Kommentar in "Sixteen Contributors (2021)"
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| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Religions
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.3390/rel12050313 |