RT Article
T1 “For I Say”: A Keeper at the Rabbinic Gates of Doubt
JF The review of rabbinic Judaism
VO 24
IS 1
SP 56
OP 72
A1 Baris, Michael
LA English
YR 2021
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1760096687
AB Abstract The rabbinic idiom “for I say” ( שאני אומר ) has been construed philologically as a specific type of presumption, buttressed with first-person rhetoric. From the perspective of legal analysis, I contend that “for I say” and presumption are diametrically opposed decision-rules, employed consistently in tannaitic and amoraic literature. While presumptions are exclusionary rules, circumscribing doubt, “for I say” is an inclusionary rule, validating doubt. The versatility of the “for I say” rule testifies to its preliminary nature – while the outcome is determined by a robust set of primary decision rules. “For I say” should be read as: for I can say, legitimizing doubt and calling on primary rabbinic rules for treating cases of factual uncertainty, in contestable instances.
K1 talmudic law
K1 Jewish law and jurisprudence
K1 factual uncertainty
K1 Narrative
K1 legal fictions
DO 10.1163/15700704-12341375