“For I Say”: A Keeper at the Rabbinic Gates of Doubt
Abstract The rabbinic idiom “for I say” ( שאני אומר ) has been construed philologically as a specific type of presumption, buttressed with first-person rhetoric. From the perspective of legal analysis, I contend that “for I say” and presumption are diametrically opposed decision-rules, employed cons...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Έκδοση: |
2021
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| Στο/Στη: |
The review of rabbinic Judaism
Έτος: 2021, Τόμος: 24, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 56-72 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Jewish law and jurisprudence
B factual uncertainty B legal fictions B Narrative B talmudic law |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Σύνοψη: | Abstract The rabbinic idiom “for I say” ( שאני אומר ) has been construed philologically as a specific type of presumption, buttressed with first-person rhetoric. From the perspective of legal analysis, I contend that “for I say” and presumption are diametrically opposed decision-rules, employed consistently in tannaitic and amoraic literature. While presumptions are exclusionary rules, circumscribing doubt, “for I say” is an inclusionary rule, validating doubt. The versatility of the “for I say” rule testifies to its preliminary nature – while the outcome is determined by a robust set of primary decision rules. “For I say” should be read as: for I can say, legitimizing doubt and calling on primary rabbinic rules for treating cases of factual uncertainty, in contestable instances. |
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| ISSN: | 1570-0704 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: The review of rabbinic Judaism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/15700704-12341375 |
