Shaming, Blaming, and Responsibility
Abstract Despite its cultural prominence, shaming has been neglected in moral philosophy. I develop an overdue account of shaming, which distinguishes it from both blaming and the mere production of shame. I distinguish between two kinds of shaming. Agential shaming is a form of blaming. It involves...
| Autore principale: | |
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Caricamento...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Pubblicazione: |
Brill
2021
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| In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Anno: 2021, Volume: 18, Fascicolo: 2, Pagine: 131-155 |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Shaming
B Shame B Reactive attitudes B Blame B Responsibility |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Riepilogo: | Abstract Despite its cultural prominence, shaming has been neglected in moral philosophy. I develop an overdue account of shaming, which distinguishes it from both blaming and the mere production of shame. I distinguish between two kinds of shaming. Agential shaming is a form of blaming. It involves holding an individual morally responsible for some wrongdoing or flaw by expressing a negative reactive attitude towards her and inviting an audience to join in. Non-agential shaming also involves negatively evaluating a person and inviting an audience to join in. Yet it is not a form of blaming, because the shamer does not hold the target morally responsible for anything. For example, we non-agentially shame people for their body shapes, for having periods, or for being victims of rape. Non-agential shaming involves the expression of an emotionally toned objective attitude, like disgust. While agential shaming enforces social norms, non-agential shaming enforces social standards. |
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| ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/17455243-bja10064 |