Shaming, Blaming, and Responsibility

Abstract Despite its cultural prominence, shaming has been neglected in moral philosophy. I develop an overdue account of shaming, which distinguishes it from both blaming and the mere production of shame. I distinguish between two kinds of shaming. Agential shaming is a form of blaming. It involves...

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Главный автор: McDonald, Lucy (Автор)
Формат: Электронный ресурс Статья
Язык:Английский
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Опубликовано: Brill 2021
В: Journal of moral philosophy
Год: 2021, Том: 18, Выпуск: 2, Страницы: 131-155
Другие ключевые слова:B Shaming
B Shame
B Reactive attitudes
B Blame
B Responsibility
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Итог:Abstract Despite its cultural prominence, shaming has been neglected in moral philosophy. I develop an overdue account of shaming, which distinguishes it from both blaming and the mere production of shame. I distinguish between two kinds of shaming. Agential shaming is a form of blaming. It involves holding an individual morally responsible for some wrongdoing or flaw by expressing a negative reactive attitude towards her and inviting an audience to join in. Non-agential shaming also involves negatively evaluating a person and inviting an audience to join in. Yet it is not a form of blaming, because the shamer does not hold the target morally responsible for anything. For example, we non-agentially shame people for their body shapes, for having periods, or for being victims of rape. Non-agential shaming involves the expression of an emotionally toned objective attitude, like disgust. While agential shaming enforces social norms, non-agential shaming enforces social standards.
ISSN:1745-5243
Второстепенные работы:Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/17455243-bja10064