Descriptive Uncertainty and Maximizing Expected Choice-Worthiness
A popular model of normative decision-making under uncertainty suggests choosing the option with the maximum expected moral choice-worthiness (MEC), where the choice-worthiness values from each moral theory, which are assumed commensurable, are weighted by credence and combined. This study adds desc...
| Главный автор: | |
|---|---|
| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Загрузка...
|
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Опубликовано: |
[2021]
|
| В: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Год: 2021, Том: 24, Выпуск: 1, Страницы: 197-211 |
| Индексация IxTheo: | NCA Этика VA Философия |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
Moral theories
B Credence B Maximum expected choice-worthiness B Normative uncertainty B Commensurability |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Итог: | A popular model of normative decision-making under uncertainty suggests choosing the option with the maximum expected moral choice-worthiness (MEC), where the choice-worthiness values from each moral theory, which are assumed commensurable, are weighted by credence and combined. This study adds descriptive uncertainty about the non-moral facts of a situation into the model by treating choice-worthiness as a random variable. When agents face greater descriptive uncertainty, the choice-worthiness random variable will have a greater spread and a larger standard deviation. MEC, as a decision rule, is sensitive only to the expected value of the random variable and not to its standard deviation. For example, MEC is insensitive to cases where an option with a large degree of descriptive uncertainty may have a higher probability of being below some threshold of impermissibility than does an option with less dispersion, even though the latter has a higher expected choice-worthiness. When applied to the same situation, similar moral theories will have statistically correlated choice-worthiness values. This correlation affects the dispersion of the credence-weighted sum of the random variables but not its expected value. Thus, MEC is insensitive to aspects of the normative situation to which a good decision-rule should be sensitive. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-020-10139-3 |
