Is there a Good Moral Argument against Moral Realism?

It has been argued that there is something morally objectionable about moral realism: for instance, according to realism, we are justified in believing that genocide is wrong only if a certain moral fact obtains, but it is objectionable to hold our moral commitments hostage to metaphysics in this wa...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Golub, Camil (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Published: [2021]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2021, Volume: 24, Issue: 1, Pages: 151-164
IxTheo Classification:NCA Ethics
NCD Political ethics
VA Philosophy
ZC Politics in general
Further subjects:B Moral Realism
B Minimal realism
B Moral arguments
B Robust realism
Online Access: Volltext (kostenfrei)

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