RT Article
T1 The Value of Transparent Self-Knowledge
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 24
IS 1
SP 65
OP 86
A1 Jongepier, Fleur 1986-
LA English
YR 2021
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1753274400
AB Questions about the normative significance of ‘transparency’ do not receive much attention, even though they were central to Richard Moran’s (2001) original account. Instead, transparency is typically studied because of its epistemic and psychological peculiarities. In this paper, I consider three normative conceptions of transparency: teleological rationalism, procedural rationalism, and relational rationalism. The first is a theory about how transparency might relate to flourishing as a rational agent; the latter two are theories about how transparency relates to non-alienated self-knowledge. All three conceptions, I argue, face serious problems. I end the paper by suggesting where the rationalist might go from here and by highlighting the importance of focusing not on the methods but on the broader circumstances in which self-knowledge is gained or lost.
K1 Alienation
K1 Authenticity
K1 Autonomy
K1 Self-knowledge
K1 Transparency
DO 10.1007/s10677-020-10118-8