Compassionate Deism and the Grammar of Permission

Both theism and atheism assume that God permits evil. But neither theism nor atheism make this assumption with due attention to what I call, following Wittgenstein, the grammar of the term ‘permission’. When this grammar is examined, it becomes clear that this assumption cannot avoid the atheistic f...

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Publié dans:Religions
Auteur principal: Hall, Ronald (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: MDPI [2021]
Dans: Religions
Année: 2021, Volume: 12, Numéro: 3
Sujets non-standardisés:B Intervention
B Compassion
B permission
B Grammar
B Wittgenstein
B Deism
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Résumé:Both theism and atheism assume that God permits evil. But neither theism nor atheism make this assumption with due attention to what I call, following Wittgenstein, the grammar of the term ‘permission’. When this grammar is examined, it becomes clear that this assumption cannot avoid the atheistic force of the argument from evil. To rescue belief in God, I propose the adoption of a position I call compassionate deism. This position is a combination of Christian theism and traditional deism. The combination is produced by making a slight deistic modification of Christian theism in the direction of non-intervention, and a slight modification of deism in the direction of compassion. Such a compassionate deism denies the common assumption made by both Christian theism and atheism, namely, that God permits evil, and thus avoids the theistic denial of the reality of evil and the atheist’s denial of God’s goodness.
ISSN:2077-1444
Référence:Kommentar in "Sixteen Contributors (2021)"
Contient:Enthalten in: Religions
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.3390/rel12030200