Compassionate Deism and the Grammar of Permission
Both theism and atheism assume that God permits evil. But neither theism nor atheism make this assumption with due attention to what I call, following Wittgenstein, the grammar of the term ‘permission’. When this grammar is examined, it becomes clear that this assumption cannot avoid the atheistic f...
| Τόπος έκδοσης: | Religions |
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| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
MDPI
[2021]
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| Στο/Στη: |
Religions
Έτος: 2021, Τόμος: 12, Τεύχος: 3 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Παρέμβαση (Διεθνές δίκαιο)
B Compassion B permission B Grammar B Wittgenstein B Deism |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Σύνοψη: | Both theism and atheism assume that God permits evil. But neither theism nor atheism make this assumption with due attention to what I call, following Wittgenstein, the grammar of the term ‘permission’. When this grammar is examined, it becomes clear that this assumption cannot avoid the atheistic force of the argument from evil. To rescue belief in God, I propose the adoption of a position I call compassionate deism. This position is a combination of Christian theism and traditional deism. The combination is produced by making a slight deistic modification of Christian theism in the direction of non-intervention, and a slight modification of deism in the direction of compassion. Such a compassionate deism denies the common assumption made by both Christian theism and atheism, namely, that God permits evil, and thus avoids the theistic denial of the reality of evil and the atheist’s denial of God’s goodness. |
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| ISSN: | 2077-1444 |
| Αναφορά: | Kommentar in "Sixteen Contributors (2021)"
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| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Religions
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.3390/rel12030200 |