Potens per accidens sine accidentibus: Ockham on Material Substances and Their Essential Powers
Abstract Medieval scholastics share a commitment to a substance-accident ontology and to an analysis of efficient causation in which agents act in virtue of their powers. Given these commitments, it seems ready-made which entities are the agents or powers: substances are agents and their accidents p...
Autore principale: | |
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Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
Lingua: | Inglese |
Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Pubblicazione: |
Brill
2021
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In: |
Vivarium
Anno: 2021, Volume: 59, Fascicolo: 1/2, Pagine: 102-122 |
Altre parole chiave: | B
William of Ockham
B Causal powers B efficient causation B Substance B Essence |
Accesso online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Riepilogo: | Abstract Medieval scholastics share a commitment to a substance-accident ontology and to an analysis of efficient causation in which agents act in virtue of their powers. Given these commitments, it seems ready-made which entities are the agents or powers: substances are agents and their accidents powers. William of Ockham, however, offers a rather different analysis concerning material substances and their essential powers, which this article explores. The article first examines Ockham’s account of propria and his reasons for claiming that a material substance is essentially powerful sine accidentibus . However, the article subsequently argues that, given Ockham’s reductionism about material substance, only substantial forms – never substances – are truly agents and powers. Thus, a material substance is essentially powerful but only by courtesy – per accidens , as Ockham calls it – because it has a non-identical part, its substantial form, which does all the causal work by itself, per se . |
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ISSN: | 1568-5349 |
Comprende: | Enthalten in: Vivarium
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/15685349-12341399 |