An empirically testable causal mechanism for divine action
A form of special divine action often considered central to the everyday experience of Christianity is that of a personal interaction with God. For example, in The Second Person Perspective in Aquinas’s Ethics, Andrew Pinsent characterises this interaction in terms of mutually empathic relations tha...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
---|---|
Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Έκδοση: |
[2020]
|
Στο/Στη: |
Stellenbosch theological journal
Έτος: 2020, Τόμος: 6, Τεύχος: 4, Σελίδες: 247-282 |
Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | NBC Δόγμα του Θεού ΖΑ Κοινωνικές επιστήμες |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Σύνοψη: | A form of special divine action often considered central to the everyday experience of Christianity is that of a personal interaction with God. For example, in The Second Person Perspective in Aquinas’s Ethics, Andrew Pinsent characterises this interaction in terms of mutually empathic relations that serve to “infuse” virtues and other attributes into a person. Such interaction requires that causal relations exist between a necessary being and the contingent universe. This paper addresses a central problem of special divine action: that the empirically identifiable causes of physical events are modally ill-suited for (and epistemically distinct from) the action of an eternal, non-composite, necessary being. Accounts of what brings about physical events are standardly empirical accounts, grounded upon experience of the world. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 2413-9467 |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Stellenbosch theological journal
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.17570/stj.2020.v6n4.a10. |