RT Article
T1 A Dilemma for Driver on Virtues of Ignorance
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 23
IS 5
SP 889
OP 898
A1 Dolin, Josh
LA English
YR 2020
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/174100747X
AB For Julia Driver, some virtues involve ignorance. Modesty, for example, is a disposition to underestimate self-worth, and blind charity is a disposition not to see others’ defects. Such “virtues of ignorance,” she argues, serve as counterexamples to the Aristotelian view that virtue requires intellectual excellence. But Driver seems to face a dilemma: if virtues of ignorance involve ignorance of valuable knowledge, then they do not merit virtue status; but if they involve ignorance of trivial knowledge, then they do not preclude intellectual excellence. So, either there are no virtues of ignorance, or there are no virtues of ignorance - at least not the sort of ignorance that precludes intellectual excellence. Virtues of ignorance therefore fail as counterexamples to Aristotelian virtue theory.
K1 Aristotelian virtue theory
K1 Ignorance
K1 Julia Driver
K1 Virtue
K1 Virtues of ignorance
DO 10.1007/s10677-020-10110-2