RT Article
T1 Prosecutorial Discretion and Republican Non-Domination
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 23
IS 5
SP 965
OP 985
A1 Crummett, Dustin
LA English
YR 2020
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1741007429
AB Prosecutors in the US legal system have great power to interfere at their discretion in the lives of citizens, and face relatively few checks on the exercise of this discretion. The vast scope of the criminal law provides a pretext for prosecuting nearly anyone. Meanwhile, other features of the legal system, such as the way plea bargains are structured and the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, further increase prosecutorial power. And existing institutional restraints on prosecutorial abuses, such as democratic accountability, the grand jury system, and the possibility of a selective prosecution defense, are mostly ineffectual. I draw on republican political theory, including insights from Philip Pettit and Elizabeth Anderson, to argue that this state of affairs gives prosecutors dominating, and therefore unjust, power over vast swathes of the public. I then survey some potential institutional changes which might help ameliorate the problem.
K1 Anderson
K1 Overcriminalization
K1 Petit
K1 Philosophy of law
K1 Republicanism
DO 10.1007/s10677-020-10122-y