RT Article
T1 Explanatory Injustice and Epistemic Agency
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 23
IS 5
SP 707
OP 722
A1 Mitova, Veli
LA English
YR 2020
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1741007259
AB What is going on when we explain someone’s belief by appeal to stereotypes associated with her gender, sexuality, race, or class? In this paper I try to motivate two claims. First, such explanations involve an overlooked form of epistemic injustice, which I call ‘explanatory injustice’. Second, the language of reasons helps us shed light on the ways in which such injustice wrongs the victim qua epistemic agent. In particular, explanatory injustice is best understood as occurring in explanations of belief through a so-called reason-why when the correct explanation in fact features a motivating reason. I reach this conclusion by arguing that such explanations are a kind of normative inversion of confabulation. Thinking in these terms helps us see both how certain reason-ascriptions empower while others disempower, and (consequently) how through them believers are robbed of agency over their beliefs.
K1 Confabulation
K1 Epistemic agency
K1 Epistemic injustice
K1 Epistemic reasons
K1 Motivating reason
K1 Rationalisation
K1 Reason-why
DO 10.1007/s10677-020-10094-z