Science and Other Common Nouns: Further Implications of Anti-Essentialism
The term “science” is a common noun that is used to designate a whole range of activities. If Reeves is right—and I think he is—that there is no essence to these activities that allows them to be objectively identified and demarcated from nonscience, then what qualifies as science is determined by c...
Autor principal: | |
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Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
Lenguaje: | Inglés |
Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2020]
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En: |
Zygon
Año: 2020, Volumen: 55, Número: 3, Páginas: 782-791 |
(Cadenas de) Palabra clave estándar: | B
Reeves, Josh A. 1976-, Against methodology in science and religion
/ Ciencias naturales
/ Religión
/ Esencialismo
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Clasificaciones IxTheo: | AB Filosofía de la religión CD Cristianismo ; Ciencia |
Otras palabras clave: | B
Essentialism
B Evolución B Language B Scientific Method B History B Pseudoscience B Truth |
Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Sumario: | The term “science” is a common noun that is used to designate a whole range of activities. If Reeves is right—and I think he is—that there is no essence to these activities that allows them to be objectively identified and demarcated from nonscience, then what qualifies as science is determined by communities. It becomes much more difficult on this antiessentialism position to identify and dismiss pseudo-science. I suggest we might find a way forward, though, by engaging a philosophical tradition that has largely been neglected in English-speaking science and religion studies, and by articulating a theory of consensus along the lines of Oreskes (2019). |
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ISSN: | 1467-9744 |
Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Zygon
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/zygo.12622 |