Science and Other Common Nouns: Further Implications of Anti-Essentialism
The term “science” is a common noun that is used to designate a whole range of activities. If Reeves is right—and I think he is—that there is no essence to these activities that allows them to be objectively identified and demarcated from nonscience, then what qualifies as science is determined by c...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2020]
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| Στο/Στη: |
Zygon
Έτος: 2020, Τόμος: 55, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 782-791 |
| Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Reeves, Josh A. 1976-, Against methodology in science and religion
/ Φυσικές επιστήμες (μοτίβο)
/ Θρησκεία (μοτίβο)
/ Ουσιοκρατία
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| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | AB Φιλοσοφία της θρησκείας, Κριτική της θρησκείας, Αθεϊσμός CF Χριστιανισμός και Επιστήμη |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Essentialism
B Language B Scientific Method B Εξέλιξη B History B Pseudoscience B Truth |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Σύνοψη: | The term “science” is a common noun that is used to designate a whole range of activities. If Reeves is right—and I think he is—that there is no essence to these activities that allows them to be objectively identified and demarcated from nonscience, then what qualifies as science is determined by communities. It becomes much more difficult on this antiessentialism position to identify and dismiss pseudo-science. I suggest we might find a way forward, though, by engaging a philosophical tradition that has largely been neglected in English-speaking science and religion studies, and by articulating a theory of consensus along the lines of Oreskes (2019). |
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| ISSN: | 1467-9744 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Zygon
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/zygo.12622 |