Epistemic Authority and Genuine Ethical Controversies
In ‘Professional Hubris and its Consequences’, Eric Vogelstein claims that ‘that there are no good arguments in favor of professional organizations taking genuinely controversial positions on issues of professional ethics’. In this response, I defend two arguments in favour of organisations taking s...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2017]
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In: |
Bioethics
Year: 2017, Volume: 31, Issue: 4, Pages: 321-324 |
IxTheo Classification: | NCH Medical ethics |
Further subjects: | B
position statements
B codes of ethics B Ama B Ana B BMA B professional organizations B Professional Ethics |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | In ‘Professional Hubris and its Consequences’, Eric Vogelstein claims that ‘that there are no good arguments in favor of professional organizations taking genuinely controversial positions on issues of professional ethics’. In this response, I defend two arguments in favour of organisations taking such positions: that their stance-taking may lead to better public policy, and that it may lead to better practice by medical professionals. If either of those defences succeeds, then Vogelstein's easy path to his conclusion - that professional organisations should not take such stances - is blocked. He or others must instead look to establish that the reasons against stance-taking on genuine ethical controversies are more compelling than those for it: plausibly a more challenging task. |
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ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12341 |