The impairment argument for the immorality of abortion: A reply
In his recent article Perry Hendricks presents what he calls the impairment argument to show that abortion is immoral. To do so, he argues that to give a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral. Because killing the fetus impairs it more than giving it fetal alcohol syndrome, Hendricks concludes that...
| Τόπος έκδοσης: | Bioethics |
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| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
| Άλλοι συγγραφείς: | ; |
| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2019]
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| Στο/Στη: |
Bioethics
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| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | NBE Ανθρωπολογία NCH Ιατρική Ηθική |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
impairment argument
B fetal alcohol syndrome B Abortion B Personhood |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Σύνοψη: | In his recent article Perry Hendricks presents what he calls the impairment argument to show that abortion is immoral. To do so, he argues that to give a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral. Because killing the fetus impairs it more than giving it fetal alcohol syndrome, Hendricks concludes that killing the fetus must also be immoral. Here, I claim that killing a fetus does not impair it in the way that giving it fetal alcohol syndrome does. By examining the reason why giving a fetus this condition is wrong, I conclude that the same reasoning, on common pro-choice accounts, does not apply to killing the fetus. Accordingly, Hendricks's argument does not succeed in showing abortion is immoral. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Αναφορά: | Kritik von "Even if the fetus is not a person, abortion is immoral (2019)"
Kritik in "(Regrettably) Abortion remains immoral (2019)" |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12576 |