Germline genome editing versus preimplantation genetic diagnosis: Is there a case in favour of germline interventions?
CRISPR is widely considered to be a disruptive technology. However, when it comes to the most controversial topic, germline genome editing (GGE), there is no consensus on whether this technology has any substantial advantages over existing procedures such as embryo selection after in vitro fertiliza...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado em: |
[2020]
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| Em: |
Bioethics
Ano: 2020, Volume: 34, Número: 1, Páginas: 60-69 |
| Classificações IxTheo: | NCH Ética da medicina |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
CRISPR
B Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis B Assisted Reproduction B non-identity problem B germline genome editing B germline gene therapy |
| Acesso em linha: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
| Resumo: | CRISPR is widely considered to be a disruptive technology. However, when it comes to the most controversial topic, germline genome editing (GGE), there is no consensus on whether this technology has any substantial advantages over existing procedures such as embryo selection after in vitro fertilization (IVF) and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). Answering this question, however, is crucial for evaluating whether the pursuit of further research and development on GGE is justified. This paper explores the question from both a clinical and a moral viewpoint, namely whether GGE has any advantages over existing technologies of selective reproduction and whether GGE could complement or even replace them. In a first step, I review an argument of extended applicability. The paper confirms that there are some scenarios in which only germline intervention allows couples to have (biologically related) healthy offspring, because selection will not avoid disease. In a second step, I examine possible moral arguments in favour of genetic modification, namely that GGE could save some embryos and that GGE would provide certain benefits for a future person that PGD does not. Both arguments for GGE have limitations. With regard to the extended applicability of GGE, however, a weak case in favour of GGE should still be made. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12635 |
