It is better to be ignorant of our moral enhancement: A reply to Zambrano
In a recent issue of Bioethics, I argued that compulsory moral bioenhancement should be administered covertly. Alexander Zambrano has criticized this argument on two fronts. First, contrary to my claim, Zambrano claims that the prevention of ultimate harm by covert moral bioenhancement fails to meet...
Autor principal: | |
---|---|
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
Idioma: | Inglês |
Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Publicado em: |
[2020]
|
Em: |
Bioethics
Ano: 2020, Volume: 34, Número: 2, Páginas: 190-194 |
Classificações IxTheo: | NCH Ética da medicina ZC Política geral |
Outras palavras-chave: | B
Melhoramento humano
B public health ethic B Quarantine B Framing effects B Autonomy B moral epistemology |
Acesso em linha: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
Resumo: | In a recent issue of Bioethics, I argued that compulsory moral bioenhancement should be administered covertly. Alexander Zambrano has criticized this argument on two fronts. First, contrary to my claim, Zambrano claims that the prevention of ultimate harm by covert moral bioenhancement fails to meet conditions for permissible liberty-restricting public health interventions. Second, contrary to my claim, Zambrano claims that covert moral bioenhancement undermines autonomy to a greater degree than does overt moral bioenhancement. In this paper, I rebut both of these arguments, then finish by noting important avenues of research that Zambrano’s arguments motivate. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
Reference: | Kritik von "Covert moral bioenhancement, public health, and autonomy (2019)"
|
Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12685 |