RT Article
T1 Moral Constraints on Gender Concepts
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 23
IS 1
SP 39
OP 51
A1 Laskowski, N. G.
LA English
PB Springer Science + Business Media B. V
YR 2020
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1694953629
AB Are words like ‘woman' or ‘man' sex terms that we use to talk about biological features of individuals? Are they gender terms that we use to talk about non-biological features e.g. social roles? Contextualists answer both questions affirmatively, arguing that these terms concern biological or non-biological features depending on context. I argue that a recent version of contextualism, floated by Jennifer Saul and defended by Esa Diaz-Leon, doesn't exhibit the right kind of flexibility to capture our theoretical intuitions or moral and political practices concerning our uses of these words. I then propose the view that terms like ‘woman' or ‘man' are polysemous, arguing that it makes better sense of the significance of some forms of criticisms of mainstream gender ideology.
K1 Contextualism
K1 Moral Philosophy
K1 Philosophy of gender
K1 philosophy of language
K1 Polysemy
DO 10.1007/s10677-020-10060-9