The Right to Feel Comfortable: Implicit Bias and the Moral Potential of Discomfort

An increasingly popular view in scholarly literature and public debate on implicit biases holds that there is progressive moral potential in the discomfort that liberals and egalitarians feel when they realize they harbor implicit biases. The strong voices among such discomfort advocates believe we...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor principal: Munch-Jurisic, Ditte Marie (Author)
Tipo de documento: Recurso Electrónico Artigo
Idioma:Inglês
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Publicado em: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2020]
Em: Ethical theory and moral practice
Ano: 2020, Volume: 23, Número: 1, Páginas: 237-250
Outras palavras-chave:B Responsibility for bias
B implicit bias
B Distress
B Affect
B Emotions
B Structural discrimination
Acesso em linha: Presumably Free Access
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Descrição
Resumo:An increasingly popular view in scholarly literature and public debate on implicit biases holds that there is progressive moral potential in the discomfort that liberals and egalitarians feel when they realize they harbor implicit biases. The strong voices among such discomfort advocates believe we have a moral and political duty to confront people with their biases even though we risk making them uncomfortable. Only a few voices have called attention to the aversive effects of discomfort. Such discomfort skeptics warn that, because people often react negatively to feeling blamed or called-out, the result of confrontational approaches is often counterproductive. To deepen this critique, I distinguish between awareness discomfort and interaction discomfort, developing a contextual approach that draws on recent research on negative affect and emotions to chart a more complete picture of the moral limits of discomfort. I argue that discomfort advocates risk overrating the moral potential of discomfort if they underestimate the extent to which context shapes the interpretation of affect and simple, raw feelings.
ISSN:1572-8447
Obras secundárias:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-020-10064-5