Cluelessness and Rational Choice: The Case of Effective Altruism
This present contribution presents an approach to making rational choices in face of cluelessness, focusing on effective altruism. I begin by illustrating how effective altruism faces the challenge of cluelessness, which implies a particular kind of incompleteness I call practical incompleteness. I...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Peeters
[2019]
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| Στο/Στη: |
Ethical perspectives
Έτος: 2019, Τόμος: 26, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 401-426 |
| Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Ethics
/ Ignorance
/ Altruism
/ Effectiveness
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| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | NCA Ηθική |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (doi) |
| Σύνοψη: | This present contribution presents an approach to making rational choices in face of cluelessness, focusing on effective altruism. I begin by illustrating how effective altruism faces the challenge of cluelessness, which implies a particular kind of incompleteness I call practical incompleteness. I then argue that this is not a reason for proponents of effective altruists to become skeptics, but rather that they ought to adjust their views and accept that these are only able to partially determine what they ought to do. I go on to present a decision-making method that can be used together with incomplete normative views such as effective altruism is presented. I conclude with an exploration of the fact that certain decision rules in combination with incomplete principles imply that dominated sequences of choices are considered rational, and suggest that one plausible approach to avoid this problem is to provide space for agent-centered reasons. |
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| ISSN: | 1783-1431 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2143/EP.26.3.3287340 |