Mitigating the Necessity of the Past in the Second Half of the Twelfth Century: Future-Dependent Predestination
Early twelfth-century logicians invoked past-tensed statements with future-oriented contents to undermine the assumption that every proposition about the past' is determinate. In the second half of the century, the notion of future-dependence was used to restrict the scope of necessity per acc...
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| 格式: | 電子 Article |
| 語言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| 出版: |
Brill
[2019]
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| In: |
Vivarium
Year: 2019, 卷: 58, 發布: 1/2, Pages: 29-64 |
| Further subjects: | B
Stephen Langton
B Hubert of Pirovano B Ars Meliduna B Ockhamism B Magister Udo B necessity per accidens B Predestination |
| 在線閱讀: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
| 總結: | Early twelfth-century logicians invoked past-tensed statements with future-oriented contents to undermine the assumption that every proposition about the past' is determinate. In the second half of the century, the notion of future-dependence was used to restrict the scope of necessity per accidens (e.g., in the Ars Meliduna). At some point, this idea began to be applied in theology to solve puzzles surrounding predestination, prescience, prophecy, and faith. In the mid-1160s, Magister Udo quotes some thinkers who insisted that the principle of the necessity of the past should exclude dicta that relate to the future', such as that he has been predestined. Peter of Poitiers adopted this Ockhamist' strategy around 1170. We find similar accounts in Simon of Tournai and Alan of Lille, who invoked it in other contexts as well. By the time of Praepositinus of Cremona, Hubert of Pirovano, and Stephen Langton, the restricted principle became something of a common view at Paris. |
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| ISSN: | 1568-5349 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Vivarium
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/15685349-12341379 |