A Hume-Inspired Argument against Reason
In the \"diminution argument,\" which Hume adduces in the Treatise section \"Scepticism with Regard to Reason,\" he infers from our universal fallibility that \"all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence.\&quo...
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Brill
[2019]
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| En: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Año: 2019, Volumen: 9, Número: 1, Páginas: 1-20 |
| (Cadenas de) Palabra clave estándar: | B
Hume, David 1711-1776, A treatise of human nature
/ Fe
/ Razón
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| Clasificaciones IxTheo: | AB Filosofía de la religión VA Filosofía |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Epistemology
B Hume B Reason B Scepticism |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
| Sumario: | In the \"diminution argument,\" which Hume adduces in the Treatise section \"Scepticism with Regard to Reason,\" he infers from our universal fallibility that \"all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence.\" My aim in this paper is, first, to show that on all extant interpretations of the argument, it turns out to be very weak, and, second, that there is in the vicinity a significant sceptical argument in support of the conclusion that all our beliefs are totally unjustified, an argument that cannot be easily dismissed. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20181321 |