Why Not Persuade the Skeptic?: A Critique of Unambitious Epistemology
What constitutes a solution to the problem of skepticism? It has been traditionally held that one must produce an argument that would rationally persuade skeptical philosophers that they are mistaken. But there is a trend in recent epistemology toward the idea that we can solve the problem without g...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
[2019]
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2019, Volume: 9, Issue: 4, Pages: 314-338 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Cognition theory
/ Scepticism
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| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Neo-Mooreanism
B Meta-epistemology B Nozick B Pyrrhonism B Skepticism B Persuasion |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | What constitutes a solution to the problem of skepticism? It has been traditionally held that one must produce an argument that would rationally persuade skeptical philosophers that they are mistaken. But there is a trend in recent epistemology toward the idea that we can solve the problem without giving skeptics any good reason to change their minds. This is what I call unambitious epistemology. This paper is a critique of that project. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20191366 |
