RT Article
T1 Hinge Epistemology, Radical Skepticism, and Domain Specific Skepticism
JF International journal for the study of skepticism
VO 9
IS 2
SP 116
OP 133
A1 Johnson, Drew
LA English
PB Brill
YR 2019
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1684115132
AB This paper explores how hinge epistemology (specifically, Duncan Pritchard's brand of hinge epistemology) might fruitfully be applied not only to the problem of radical skepticism, but also to certain domain specific (or ‘local') skepticisms, and in particular, moral skepticism. The paper explains the idea of a domain specific skepticism, and how domain specific skepticisms contrast with radical skepticism. I argue that a domain specific skeptical problem can be resolved in just the same way as radical skepticism, if there are hinge commitments within that domain. I then suggest that there are hinge commitments in the moral domain, and use this to address a moral skeptical problem due to our apparent inability to know moral nihilism to be false.
K1 Duncan Pritchard
K1 hinge epistemology
K1 local skepticism
K1 moral epistemology
K1 moral skepticism
K1 radical skepticism
DO 10.1163/22105700-20191302