RT Article
T1 The Nature and Limits of Skeptical Criticism
JF International journal for the study of skepticism
VO 9
IS 3
SP 183
OP 205
A1 Avnur, Yuval
LA English
PB Brill
YR 2019
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/168411506X
AB Is there something wrong with the way we form beliefs about our surroundings? Most people assume not. But there is a character, the skeptic, who disagrees. What, exactly, is this skeptic claiming, and why should this concern us? We are, after all, just humans doing what humans do: forming beliefs on the basis of our faculties. In what sense could this be wrong, and how could it matter if it is? By considering the way in which the notions of vice and criticism can express these questions, we can clarify them and discern some potential answers. These answers, I will suggest, can explain not only why we shouldn't worry too much, but also the lasting appeal of skeptical problems. The idea is that we can accept, or grant for the sake of argument, that we fall short of some important standard while insisting that it is entirely unreasonable to criticize people, or ourselves, on that basis.
K1 epistemic vice
K1 Epistemology
K1 ethics of belief
K1 Excuses
K1 Skepticism
K1 Virtue epistemology
DO 10.1163/22105700-20191376