RT Article
T1 Radically insensitive theists
JF Religious studies
VO 55
IS 2
SP 169
OP 188
A1 Kirk-Giannini, Cameron Domenico
LA English
PB Cambridge Univ. Press
YR 2019
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/166795542X
AB Sceptical theists attempt to meet the challenge to theism posed by evidential arguments from evil by appealing to the limitations of human cognition. Drawing on an exchange between William Rowe and Michael Bergmann, I argue that consistent sceptical theists must be radically insensitive to certain kinds of evidence about prima facie evils - that is, that they must endorse the claim that not even evidence of extreme and pervasive suffering could justify disbelief in theism. I show that Bergmann's attempt to respond to this problem does not succeed and argue that no alternative response is forthcoming, concluding that the threat of radical insensitivity constitutes a serious and underappreciated difficulty for sceptical theism.
DO 10.1017/S003441251800032X