Military realism: the logic and limits of force and innovation in the US Army
Military Realism -- Flexible Response, the Nuclear Battlefield, and Counterinsurgency: Kennedy and Army Doctrine in the 1960s -- Army Doctrine in the Shadow of Vietnam: Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 1968 -- From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Cold War Doctrine of the '70s and '80s...
| Auteur principal: | |
|---|---|
| Type de support: | Imprimé Livre |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Service de livraison Subito: | Commander maintenant. |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| WorldCat: | WorldCat |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
Columbia
University of Missouri Press
[2019]
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| Dans: | Année: 2019 |
| Collection/Revue: | American military experience
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| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
USA
/ Insurrection
/ Lutte
/ Doctrine militaire
/ Histoire 1960-2008
B Girard, René 1923-2015 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Military doctrine (United States)
History 20th century
B Military doctrine (United States) History 21st century B United States Military policy |
| Accès en ligne: |
Table des matières (Aggregator) |
| Édition parallèle: | Électronique
|
| Résumé: | Military Realism -- Flexible Response, the Nuclear Battlefield, and Counterinsurgency: Kennedy and Army Doctrine in the 1960s -- Army Doctrine in the Shadow of Vietnam: Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 1968 -- From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Cold War Doctrine of the '70s and '80s -- The Power Projection Army: Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era until the Eve of September 11 -- Transforming under Fire: The Global War on Terror, Counterinsurgency, Iraq, and Operations 2008. "After the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army considered counterinsurgency (COIN) a mistake to be avoided. Many found it surprising, then, when setbacks in recent conflicts led the same army to adopt a COIN doctrine. Scholarly debates have primarily employed existing theories of military bureaucracy or culture to explain the army's re-embrace of COIN, but Peter Campbell advances a unique argument centering on military realism to explain the complex evolution of army doctrinal thinking from 1960 to 2008. In five case studies of U.S. Army doctrine, Campbell pits military realism against bureaucratic and cultural perspectives in three key areas--nuclear versus conventional warfare, preferences for offense versus defense, and COIN missions--and finds that the army has been more doctrinally flexible than those perspectives would predict. He demonstrates that decision makers, while vowing in the wake of Vietnam to avoid COIN missions, nonetheless found themselves adapting to the geopolitical realities of fighting "low intensity" conflicts. In essence, he demonstrates that pragmatism has won out over dogmatism. At a time when American policymakers remain similarly conflicted about future defense strategies, Campbell's work will undoubtedly shape and guide the debate"-- |
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| Description: | Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Description matérielle: | XVI, 374 pages |
| ISBN: | 978-0-8262-2184-1 |
