RT Article
T1 What's Left for the Companions in Guilt Argument?
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 22
IS 1
SP 137
OP 151
A1 Clipsham, Patrick
LA English
YR 2019
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1662931328
AB Companions in guilt arguments (CGAs) respond to moral error theory by pointing out that its philosophical rationale mandates the rejection of all categorical normative reasons, including epistemic reasons. A number of philosophers (including Christopher Cowie, Jonas Olson, Richard Rowland, and Ramon Das) have recently been engaging in a dialogue about the strength of this argumentative strategy and the significance of the criticisms that has been raised against it. In this paper, I identify a specific argument, which I dub the 'bullet-biting response' as a crucial element in some recent attacks on the CGA. I assess five objections to the bullet-biting response and conclude that only the fifth poses a significant problem. Specifically, I argue that the proponent of the bullet-biting response is at a dialectical disadvantage in this particular debate. While this disadvantage is not decisive, it has two implications (one theoretical and one practical) that raise serious concerns for the bullet-biting response.
K1 Companions in guilt
K1 Epistemic reasons
K1 Metaethics
DO 10.1007/s10677-019-09981-x