Reason and emotion in the ethics of self-restraint: a critique of Reinhold Niebuhr
In this essay I argue that Reinhold Niebuhr's ethics of self-restraint, though promising, is based on an incomplete and imprecise moral psychology. Although Niebuhr claims that reason cannot provide a sufficient grounding to motivate self-restraint, he does not disclose which human capacity mig...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic/Print Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Wiley
[2014]
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In: |
Journal of religious ethics
Year: 2014, Volume: 42, Issue: 3, Pages: 495-515 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Niebuhr, Reinhold 1892-1971
/ Self-obligation
/ Reason
/ Emotion
/ Moral psychology
/ Feminist ethics
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IxTheo Classification: | AE Psychology of religion NCA Ethics NCB Personal ethics ZD Psychology |
Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | In this essay I argue that Reinhold Niebuhr's ethics of self-restraint, though promising, is based on an incomplete and imprecise moral psychology. Although Niebuhr claims that reason cannot provide a sufficient grounding to motivate self-restraint, he does not disclose which human capacity might serve this purpose. I suggest that we can address this oversight by strengthening Niebuhr's tentative embrace of David Hume, and by developing a concept of the emotions in order to explain how human beings can cultivate a stable inclination to self-restraint. This project is informed by and in the service of feminist critiques of Niebuhr and social concerns. |
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ISSN: | 0384-9694 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/jore.12067 |