Reason and emotion in the ethics of self-restraint: a critique of Reinhold Niebuhr

In this essay I argue that Reinhold Niebuhr's ethics of self-restraint, though promising, is based on an incomplete and imprecise moral psychology. Although Niebuhr claims that reason cannot provide a sufficient grounding to motivate self-restraint, he does not disclose which human capacity mig...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Morris, Daniel A. (Author)
Format: Electronic/Print Article
Language:English
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Published: Wiley [2014]
In: Journal of religious ethics
Year: 2014, Volume: 42, Issue: 3, Pages: 495-515
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Niebuhr, Reinhold 1892-1971 / Self-obligation / Reason / Emotion / Moral psychology / Feminist ethics
IxTheo Classification:AE Psychology of religion
NCA Ethics
NCB Personal ethics
ZD Psychology
Online Access: Volltext (doi)
Description
Summary:In this essay I argue that Reinhold Niebuhr's ethics of self-restraint, though promising, is based on an incomplete and imprecise moral psychology. Although Niebuhr claims that reason cannot provide a sufficient grounding to motivate self-restraint, he does not disclose which human capacity might serve this purpose. I suggest that we can address this oversight by strengthening Niebuhr's tentative embrace of David Hume, and by developing a concept of the emotions in order to explain how human beings can cultivate a stable inclination to self-restraint. This project is informed by and in the service of feminist critiques of Niebuhr and social concerns.
ISSN:0384-9694
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/jore.12067