The paradox of ineffability

Saying that x is ineffable seems to be paradoxical - either I cannot say anything about x, not even that it is ineffable - or I can say that it is ineffable, but then I can say something and it is not ineffable. In this article, I discuss Alston’s version of the paradox and a solution proposed by Hi...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Gäb, Sebastian 1982- (Autor)
Tipo de documento: Print Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
Verificar disponibilidad: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Publicado: [2017]
En: International journal of philosophy and theology
Año: 2017, Volumen: 78, Número: 3, Páginas: 289-300
(Cadenas de) Palabra clave estándar:B Alston, William P. 1921-2009 / Hick, John 1922-2012 / Dionysius, Areopagita, De mystica theologia / Inefabilidad / Dios
Clasificaciones IxTheo:KAB Cristianismo primitivo
KAJ Época contemporánea
NBC Dios
VA Filosofía
Otras palabras clave:B John Hick
B Mysticism
B William Alston
B Ineffability
Descripción
Sumario:Saying that x is ineffable seems to be paradoxical - either I cannot say anything about x, not even that it is ineffable - or I can say that it is ineffable, but then I can say something and it is not ineffable. In this article, I discuss Alston’s version of the paradox and a solution proposed by Hick which employs the concept of formal and substantial predicates. I reject Hick’s proposal and develop a different account based on some passages from Pseudo-Dionysius’ Mystica Theologia. ‘God is ineffable’ is a metalinguistic statement concerning propositions about God: not all propositions about God are expressible in a human language.
ISSN:2169-2327
Obras secundarias:Enthalten in: International journal of philosophy and theology